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This document examines GHG emission policy in a world where labor and emissions are 
complementary in production, world-wide emissions decrease welfare, and total factor 
productivity can be locally improved by devoting labor to R&D. A subset of the countries 
can establish an "abatement coalition" where an international agency grants non-traded or 
traded GHG permits. This agency is self-interested, subject to lobbying, and has no budget 
of its own. The results are the following. The establishment of the ``abatement coalition" 
enhances welfare, promotes economic growth and diminishes emissions both inside and 
outside the coalition. Without technological change, emission permit trade does not make 
any difference. With technological change due to R&D, the agreement with emission 
permit trade is Pareto worsening. 
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1 Introduction
This document considers two issues of emission policy: (i) If some countries
limit their GHG emissions, then how do the other “free-riding” countries
respond to this? (ii) How much authority should the GHG-limiting countries
delegate to an international agency that coordinates their actions?
The EU has been willing to act as a leader of international climate policy
(Oberthu¨r 2009; Vogler 2005). However, because concerns over the compet-
itiveness of the EU and the political influence of industry pressure groups
have generated substantial concessions to the emitting sectors (Markussen
and Svendsen 2005; Neuhoff et al. 2006), it is realistic to assume a non-
benevolent policy maker. This document assumes that the international
agency in a coalition of countries is self-interested and subject to lobbying.
In the literature, there are different results on free riding in emission policy
depending on the structure of the model. Babiker (2005) shows in a multi-
good model of international trade that the escape of dirty industries from
a coalition of abating countries offsets emission reductions achieved within
that coalition. In contrast, Grubb et al. (2002) and Di Maria and van der
Werf (2008) show in a variety-expansion model of growth that local emission
cuts spur GHG-saving innovations, generating emission cuts elsewhere.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) consider emission permit trading in a two-
good two-factor model. They show that with the terms-of-trade effect,
such trading may increase GHG emissions and make both trading partners
worse off. This document ignores the terms-of-trade effect and assumes one
internationally-tradable good, with quality ladders in technology.
Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005) derive optimal schemes for the free alloca-
tion of emission allowances in a dynamic context, but with no technological
change. They consider emissions-based allocation rules which allow for up-
dating of the basis of allocation over time.1 They show that with an absolute
1Later on, Mackenzie et al. (2008) extend Bo¨hringer and Lange’s (2005) analysis to
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cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances propor-
tionally to past emissions are first-best. This document considers grandfa-
thering as well, but in the case where the emission cap is endogenously de-
termined by negotiation between the countries and the international agency.
Haurie et al. (2006) construct the necessary optimality conditions for
a negotiation game in the following situation: (a) There is an exogenous
precise constraint on the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. (b) An
international agreement should be reached on the relative development paths
of the different countries and their use of GHGs to foster their development.
(c) GHG are used as a by-product in the economic production process, per-
mitting the use of cheaper “dirty” technologies, but their abatement can also
be used as a source of income in an international emissions trading system.
(d) The agreement should be self-enforcing, i.e. there must be a noncooper-
ative equilibrium of the strategic game between the countries.
This document assumes self-enforcing agreements, but departs from the
other assumptions of Haurie et al. (2006) as follows: (a),(b) The constraint
on global GHG emissions is endogenously determined by negotiation be-
tween the countries and the international agency. (c) GHG emissions are
an input, not a by-product in the economic production process. With these
modifications, one can examine the entire negotiation game starting from the
determination of emission caps instead of a subgame of that starting from
the imposition of emission caps.
Gersbach and Winkler (2011) propose a blueprint for an international
emission permit market (e.g. the EU trading scheme) as follows. Each coun-
try decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these
permits is freely allocated, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the
auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries
in fixed proportions. Gersbach and Winkler show that international per-
a more general design of a dynamic initial allocation mechanism, which allows for the
allocation of permits to be based on each firm’s choices relative to other firms.
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mit markets with refunding make all countries to tighten their issuance of
permits, thereby increasing welfare in all countries. If the share of freely
allocated permits is sufficiently small, socially optimal emission reductions
can be obtained. In contrast to Gersbach and Winkler (2011), there is no
refunding in the model of this document.
Caplan et al. (2003) show that an international policy scheme with emis-
sion permit trading, redistributive transfers and global participation yields
an efficient allocation for a global economy. Their analysis is however based
on the assumption of an altruistic international agency that operates the
resource transfer mechanism. This document assumes a self-interested inter-
national agency that runs emission policy, has no direct transfer instruments
and is subject to lobbying by the local governments.
Palokangas (2009) examines the implementation of emission policy with
a self-interested international agency in a quality-ladders model of growth.
That article shows that on fairly general conditions, emission trade speeds
up growth from the initial position of laissez-faire, but slows down from
the initial position of centrally-determined emission quotas. This document
assumes that there are free riders, with different preferences and technology.
In that framework, a simple grandfathering scheme of granting GHG permits
is shown to be Pareto superior to using the traded GNG permits.
This document is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the general
structure of the economy. Section 3 examines free rider, Section 4 grandfa-
thering and Section 5 trade in GHG permits, respectively.
2 The model
Let a great number of countries be placed evenly within the limit [0, N ].
In each country j ∈ [0, N ], there is a representative agent (hereafter called
country j) that has the full control of resources in that country. Labor and
emissions are the primary factors of production. All countries possess one
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unit of labor which can be used in production or research and development
(R&D). R&D improves total factor productivity (TFP) in the country.
The source of externality is that total emissions in all countries,
M =
∫ N
0
mjdj. (1)
hurt everybody in all countries. Subset [0, n] of countries [0, N ] establishes an
abatement coalition in which an international agency attempts to regulate
GHG emissions. The agency is self-interested and subject to lobbying from
the member countries j ∈ [0, n]. The remainder of countries, j ∈ (n,N ], are
free riders. In this setting, two questions are posed:
(i) Is the agreement on the coalition self-enforcing, i.e. is there a noncooper-
ative equilibrium of the strategic game between the member countries?
(ii) Should emission permit trade be introduced into the coalition?
2.1 Preferences
To simplify the model, this document eliminates
• the terms-of-trade effect by the assumption that there is only one con-
sumption good in all countries, and
• international capital movements in equilibrium by the assumption that
all countries share the same constant rate of time preference, ρ.
With these assumptions, the countries can grow at different rates in a stationary-
state equilibrium.
Country j chooses its flow of consumption Cj to maximize its expected
utility starting at time T ,
E
∫ ∞
T
CjM
−δje−ρ(θ−T )dθ, δj > 0, ρ > 0, (2)
where E is the expectation operator, θ time, ρ the constant rate of time
preference and δj a parameter. The higher δj, the more country j dislikes
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emissions M . Because there is no money that would pin down the nominal
prices in the model, the consumption price can be normalized P at M−δ:
P = M−δ. (3)
2.2 Production
Country j devotes the amount lj of its labor to production and the rest
zj = 1− lj (4)
to R&D. It produces the consumption good from labor lj and emissions mj,
but improves its TFP through its R&D.
When country j develops a new technology, it increases its total factor
productivity (TFP) by constant a > 1. Its TFP is then equal to aγj , where
γj is its serial number of technology. Given TFP, country j is subject to
the CES production function f j(lj,mj), where lj (mj) is the input of labor
(emissions). Thus, it produces the consumption good according to
Yj = a
γjf j(lj,mj). (5)
This document makes the plausible assumption that labor lj and emis-
sions mj are gross complements, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between
them is less than one. This means that an increase in the relative use of
emissions, mj/lj, decreases the value-added proportion of emissions, ξj:
mjf
j
n(lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
=
f jn(lj/mj, 1)
f j(lj/mj, 1)
.
= ξj
( lj
mj
)
, ξ′j > 0,
ljf
j
l (lj,mj)
f j(lj,mj)
= 1− ξj
( lj
mj
)
, f jl
.
=
∂f
∂lj
, f jn
.
=
∂f j
∂mj
. (6)
2.3 Research and development (R&D)
The improvement of technology in country j depends on labor devoted to
R&D in that country, zj. In a small period of time dθ, the probability that
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R&D leads to development of a new technology with a jump from γj to γj+1
is given by λzjdθ, while the probability that R&D remains without success is
given by 1− λzjdθ, where λ is productivity in R&D. Noting (4), this defines
a Poisson process χj with
dχj =
{
1 with probability λzjdθ = λ(1− lj)dθ,
0 with probability 1− λzjdθ = 1− λ(1− lj)dθ, (7)
where dχj is the increment of the process χj. The expected growth rate of
productivity aγj in the production sector in the stationary state is given by
gj
.
= E
[
log aγ+1 − log aγ] = (log a)λzj = (log a)λ(1− lj),
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59).
Because the expected growth rate gj of output in country j is in fixed pro-
portion to zj, then labor devoted to R&D in that country, zj = 1 − lj, can
be used as a proxy of growth in that country.
3 Free riders
3.1 Optimal program
Free-riding country j ∈ (n,N ] consumes what it produces, Cj = Yj. It
behaves in Cournot manner and takes emissions in the other countries
m−j
.
= M −mj =
∫
k 6=j
mkdk (8)
as given. Plugging Cj = Yj, (5) and (8) into (2) and using the expectation
operator E, one obtains its expected utility starting at time T as follows:
E
∫ ∞
T
CjM
−δje−ρ(θ−T )dθ = E
∫ ∞
T
YjM
−δje−ρ(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
e−ρ(θ−T )dθ. (9)
Country j ∈ (n,N ] maximizes its expected utility (9) by its emissions and
labor in production, (mj, lj), subject to Poisson technological change (7),
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holding the emissions elsewhere, m−j, constant. The solution is this optimal
program is given by (cf. Appendix A)
zj(M) with z
′
j < 0 and mj(M) with m
′
j > 0 for j ∈ (n,N ],∫ N
n
m′jdj <
1
M
∫ N
n
mjdj < 1. (10)
Inserting (10) into (8) yields M = mj(M) + m−j. Differentiating this
totally and noting (4) and (10), one obtains
dM
dm−j
=
1
1−m′j
> 0,
dmj
dm−j
= m′j
dM
dm−j
> 0,
dzj
dm−j
= z′j
dM
dm−j
< 0.
In other worlds:
Proposition 1 Emission cuts elsewhere (i.e. a fall in m−j) decrease a free
rider’s emissions, dmj/dm−j > 0, but promote its growth, dzj/dm−j < 0.
3.2 Strategic complementarity
In the literature, a number of effects have been proposed to explain this
strategic complementarity of emission policy:
• Income effect. An increase in the free riders’ real income due to emission
policy decreases emissions (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 2005).
• Induced-technology effect. Induced technological change reduces emis-
sions among free riders (e.g. Di Maria and Van der Werf 2008).
• Technology-spillover effect. The emission constraint inside the “abate-
ment coalition” generates improvements in abatement technology.
These improvements spill over to free riders, which then decrease their
emissions (Golombek and Hoel 2004; Gerlach and Kuik 2007).
Proposition 1 provides an alternative explanation of the strategic comple-
mentarity of emission policy as follows: If the rest of the world decreases its
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emissions m−j, then, given preferences (2), the marginal disutility of total
emissions in country j, −∂(CjM−δj)/∂m−j, increases,
−∂
2(CjM
−δj)
∂m2−j
= −∂
2(CjM
−δj)
∂M2
= −(δj + 1)δjM−δj−2Cj.
This compels free rider j ∈ (n,N ] to reduce its emissions mj. Because labor
and emissions are complementary in production, labor input in production,
lj, falls. This decreases the wage, promoting labor-intensive R&D. A higher
level of R&D speeds up economic growth.
3.3 Total emissions
Noting (1) and (10), total emissions M = MN are determined by
M =
∫ n
0
mkdk +
∫ N
n
mk(M)dk.
Noting (10), this equation defines the function
M =M
(∫ n
0
mkdk
)
with 1 <M′ = 1
1− ∫ N
n
m′k(M)dk
<
1
1− 1
M
∫ n
M
mkdk
=
M
M − ∫ n
M
mkdk
=
M∫ n
0
mkdk
. (11)
Thus, emission policy in the coalition,
∫ n
0
mkdk, is amplified by the multiplier
M′ > 1 due to the response of the free riders.
4 Grandfathering
Grandfathering means that emission permits have a base that is determined
by the history, but updated over time. In the quality-ladders model of
this document, grandfathering can be specified as follows. The interna-
tional agency sets the emission permits for country j, mj, in fixed proportion
ε ∈ [0, 1] to the emissions of that country under previous technology, m̂j:2
mj = εm̂j for j ∈ [0, n] and ε ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
2That is, if the current number of technology is given by τj , then the allocation base
m̂j is calculated by emissions under previous technology τj − 1 (cf. Subsection 2.3).
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When the international agency tightens emission policy by decreasing ε, the
rule (12) determines the emissions of the member countries, mj for j ∈ [0, n].
The international agency of the abatement coalition [0, n] sets non-traded
emission permits on its members j ∈ [0, n], but it has no control over free
riders j ∈ (n,N ]. The coalition members j ∈ [0, n] lobby the international
agency over these permits. I assume that the members of the coalition share
the same preferences and technology, for simplicity:3
δj = δ and f
j(lj,mj) = f(lj,mj) for j ∈ [0, n]. (13)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), it is assumed that the interna-
tional agency has its own interests and collects political contributions. Coun-
try j ∈ [0, n] pays its contributions Rj in money terms to the international
agency which decides on a specific emission permit mj for this.
Let the set of emission permits be defined by m[0,n]
.
= {mk| k ∈ [0, n]},
and the set of political contributions by R[0,n]
.
= {Rk| k ∈ [0, n]}. The or-
der of the common agency game is then the following. First, the member
countries j ∈ [0, n] set their political contributions R[0,n] conditional on the
international agency’s prospective policy ε. Second, the international agency
sets the permits ε and collects the contributions. Third, the countries max-
imize their utilities. This game is solved in reverse order: Subsection 4.1
considers countries and 4.2 the political equilibrium.
4.1 Optimal program
Country j ∈ [0, n] pays political contributions Rj to the international agency.
It is assumed, for simplicity, that the international agency consists of civil
servants who inhabit countries j ∈ [0, n] evenly. This implies that each
country j gets an equal share 1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk of total contributions. Thus, the
net revenue of country j ∈ [0, n] from political contributions is given by
3If the members were heterogeneous, then there is no unique solution for the menu
auction models in Subsections 4.2 and 5.2.
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1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk−Rj in money terms and
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk−Rj
)
/P in real terms, where
P is the price of the consumption good. Noting the choice of the numeraire,
(3), and the production function (5), consumption in country j is then
Cj = Yj +
1
P
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
= aγjf j(lj,mj) +M
δ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
,
(14)
where Yj is real income from production and
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk − Rj
)
/P real net
revenue from political contributions in country j.
Because total emission permits M and political contributions R[0,n] are
not random variables, noting (13) and (14), the expected utility of country
j ∈ [0, n] starting at time T , (2), becomes
Υj = E
∫ ∞
T
[
aγjf j(lj,mj)M
−δ +
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
]
e−ρ(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf j(lj,mj)M
−δe−ρ(θ−T )dθ +
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(θ−T )dθ
= M−δE
∫ ∞
T
aγjf j(lj,mj)e
−ρ(θ−T )dθ +
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
. (15)
Country j ∈ [0, n] maximizes its expected utility (15) by its labor devoted to
production, lj, subject to Poisson technological change (7), given the emission
permits m[0,n] and the political contributions R[0,n]. The solution is this
optimal program is given by (cf. Appendix B)
Υj(m[0,n], R[0,n],M)
=
aγj(T )f(l∗j ,mj)
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
M
(∫ n
0
mkdk
)−δ
+
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
, (16)
where γj(T ) is the serial number of technology at the initial time T and l
∗
j is
the optimal labor input for which
(a− 1)λl∗j
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
= 1− ξ
(
l∗j
mj
)
(17)
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holds true. Noting (6), the partial derivatives of the function (16) are
∂Υj
∂mj
=
aγj(T )f(l∗j ,mj)M
−δ
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
fm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− δ
M
M′
]
=
aγj(T )f(l∗j ,mj)M
−δ
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
1
mj
ξ
(
lj
mj
)
− δ
M
M′
]
,
∂Υj
∂mk
= − δΓ
j
M δ+1
M′ for k ∈ [0, n] \ {j}, ∂Υ
j
∂Rj
=
(
1
n
− 1
)
1
ρ
. (18)
4.2 The political equilibrium
Because each country j ∈ [0, n] affects the international agency by its con-
tributions Rj, its contribution schedule depends on the agency’s policy ε:
Rj(ε), j ∈ [0, n], R[0,n](ε) .= {Rk(ε)| k ∈ [0, n]}. (19)
The international agency maximizes present value the expected flow of the
real political contributions Rj from all countries j ∈ [0, n]:
G
(
R[0,n]
) .
= E
∫ ∞
T
(∫ n
0
Rjdj
)
e−θ(θ−T )dθ =
1
ρ
∫ n
0
Rjdj. (20)
Each country j ∈ [0, n] maximizes its expected utility (16).
According to Dixit at al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
this game is a set of contribution schedules Rj(ε) and a policy ε such that
the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Υj ≥ 0.
(ii) The policy ε maximizes the international agency’s welfare (20) taking
the contribution schedules Rj(ε) as given,
ε ∈ arg max
ε
G
(
R[0,n](ε)
)
= arg max
ε
∫ n
0
Rj(ε)dj; (21)
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(iii) Country j cannot have a feasible strategy Rj(ε) that yields it a higher
level of utility than in equilibrium, given the international agency’s
anticipated decision rule,
ε = arg max
ε
Υj
(
m[0,n], R[0,n]\j, Rj(ε)
)
with mj = εm̂j for j ∈ [0, n].
(22)
(iv) Country j provides the international agency at least with the level
of utility than in the case it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the agency
responds optimally given the other countries contribution functions,
G
(
R[0,n](ε)
) ≥ max
ε
G
(
R[0,n](ε)
)∣∣∣
Rj=0
.
Noting (12) and (18), the condition (22) is equivalent to
0 =
∂Υj
∂Rj
dRj
dε
+
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
∂mk
∂ε
dk =
(
1
n
− 1
)
1
ρ
dRj
dε
+
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
m̂kdk
for j ∈ [0, n] and
dRj
dε
=
ρn
1− n
∫ n
0
∂Υj
∂mk
m̂kdk =
ρnΓjM−δ
1− n
[
ξ
(
lj
mj
)
m̂j
mj
−
∫ n
0
δ
(MN)′
M
m̂kdk
]
for j ∈ [0, n]. Given these equations, one obtains∫ n
0
dRj
dε
dj =
ρnM−δ
1− n
∫ n
0
Γj
[
ξ
(
lj
mj
)
m̂j
mj
− δM
′
M
∫ n
0
m̂kdk
]
dj.
Noting this, the equilibrium condition (21) is equivalent to
m̂j
mj
ξ
(
lj
mj
)
=
δM′
M
∫ n
0
m̂kdk. (23)
Let us consider a stationary state where inputs (lj,mj) are independent
of the number of technology τj for countries j ∈ [0, n]. Because the emissions
of country j under the previous technology m̂j and under current technology
mj must be equal after subsequent changes in technology, it must be ε = 0 in
the stationary state. The political equilibrium is specified by the equilibrium
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conditions (17) for all countries j ∈ [0, n] plus that (23) for the international
agency. In this system, there are unknown variables mj and lj for j ∈ [0, n].
This yields a stationary state with perfect symmetry:
lj = l
N and m̂j = mj = m
N for j ∈ [0, n]. (24)
Given this, (9) and (11), the equilibrium conditions (17) and (23) become
ξ
(
lN
mN
)
= δ
nmNM′(nmN)
M(nmN) , (25)
(a− 1)λlN
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lN) = 1− ξ
(
lN
mN
)
.
(26)
4.3 Pareto optimum
If there were a benevolent international agency that would maximize the
representative household’s welfare in the coalition and make inter-countryal
transfers for that purpose, it could entirely internalize the externality though
GHG emissions and the outcome is a Pareto optimum. In that case, the
coalition would behave as if there were a single jurisdiction, n = 1. Noting
(24)-(26), this Pareto optimum (MP , lP ,mP ) is given by
ξ
(
lP
mP
)
= δ
mPM′(mP )
M(mP ) ,
(a− 1)λlP
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lP ) = 1− ξ
(
lP
mM
)
,
(27)
where MP total pollution in the world, lP total labor input in production in
the coalition and mP total emissions in the coalition. Comparing the system
(11)-(26) with the system (27) of three equations yields the following result:
Proposition 2 With grandfathering, the coalition attains its Pareto opti-
mum, i.e. MP = MN , lP = nlN and mP = nmN .
Proposition 2 can be explained as in Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005). The
introduction of an international agency helps to internalize the negative ex-
ternality through GHG emissions. With the uniform proportionality rule ε,
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all countries face the same marginal benefits from emissions via allocation
in subsequent periods. Because the basis for allocation, m̂j, can be updated
over time, the international agency has a full control of resources. This holds
true for both a benevolent and a self-interested agency. However, in con-
trast to Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005), the emission cap MP is not exogenous
but endogenously determined by the negotiation game between the member
countries j ∈ [0, n] and the international agency.
5 Emission permit trade
In this section, I extend the framework of the preceding section so that
the countries in the abatement coalition [0, n] can trade in emission permits
among themselves. Thus, emission permits and actual emissions can differ.
I assume that the international agency has one policy instrument qj for
each country j ∈ [0, n]. With more instruments per country, the agency
could deprive the countries j ∈ [0, n] of their surpluses by two-part tariffs.4
How should the instruments q[0,n]
.
= {qk| k ∈ [0, n]} then be specified?
If the emission permits were given in the same units as emissions, emission
permit trade would equalize the marginal products of emissions, aγjf jm(lj,mj)
for all countries j ∈ [0, n] in the coalition. In that case, a stationary state
equilibrium (with constant inputs lj and mj) would be impossible, because
the total factor productivity aγj jumps at different times in different coun-
tries. Without a stationary state equilibrium, there would be no negotiation
agreement between the countries and the international agency. To enable a
stationary state equilibrium, it is assumed that the emission permits, qj, are
set for emissions mj times the level of productivity, a
γj for country j ∈ [0, n].
When country j has excess permits, mja
γj < qj, it can sell the difference
qj −mjaγj to the other members of the coalition at the price p. Corre-
spondingly, when country j has excess emissions, aγjmj > qj, it must buy
4Cf. Dixit el al. (1997).
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the difference mja
γj − qj from the others at the price p. In equilibrium, the
price p for emission permits adjusts so that the demand for emission permits,∫ n
0
mja
γjdj, is equal to the supply of those,
∫ n
0
qkdk:∫ n
0
mja
γjdj =
∫ n
0
qkdk. (28)
This modification changes the common agency game into the following.
First, the countries set their political contributions R[0,n] conditional on the
international agency’s prospective policy q[0,n]
.
= {qk| k ∈ [0, n]}. Second,
the international agency sets the permits q[0,n] and collect the contributions.
Third, the price for permits p adjust to clear the market for emission permits.
Fourth, the countries maximize their utilities. This game is solved in reverse
order: Subsection 5.1 considers countries and 5.2 the political equilibrium.
5.1 Optimal program
With emission permit trade, consumption in country j, (29), changes into
[cf. the numeraire (3)]
Cj = Yj +
1
P
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
+
p
P
(qj −mjaγj)
= aγjf j(lj,mj) +M
δ
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + p(qj −mjaγj)
]
,
(29)
where Yj is real income from production,
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk−Rj
)
/P real net revenue
from political contributions and (p/P )
(
qj − mjaγj
)
real net revenue from
emission permit trade in country j. Because emission permits q[0,n] and
political contributions R[0,n] are not random variables, noting (8) and (29),
the expected utility of country j ∈ [0, n] starting at time T , (15), becomes
∆j = E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f j(lj,mj)
M δ
− pmj
]
e−ρ(θ−T )dθ
+
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + pqj
)∫ ∞
T
e−ρ(θ−T )dθdθ
= E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− pmj
]
e−ρ(θ−T )dθ +
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + pqj
)
.
(30)
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Country j maximizes its expected utility (30) by emission and labor input
(mj, lj) subject to Poisson technological change (7), given the permits q[0,n],
the emission price p, emissions in the rest of the world, m−j, and political
contributions R[0,n]. In Appendix C, it is shown that the solution of this
optimal program is given by
∆j(q[0,n], R[0,n])
.
=
aγj(T )
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
+
1
ρ
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + p(mT )qj
]
,
(31)
and the equilibrium conditions for lj for any country j ∈ [0, n] by
(a− 1)λlT
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT ) =
f(lT ,mT )M(nmT )−δ
f(lT ,mT )M(nmT )−δ − p(mT )mT
[
1− ξ
(
lT
mT
)]
,
(32)
where
p(mT )
.
=
f(lT ,mT )
M(nmT )δmT
[
ξ
(
lT
mT
)
− δm
T
M(nmT )
]
,
(33)
lj = l
T and mj = m
T =
(∫ n
0
qkdk
)/∫ n
0
aγjdj for j ∈ [0, n]. (34)
In Appendix C, I show furthermore that
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
∆j(R[0,n], q[0,n])dj =
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT )
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δmT
×
[
ξ
(
lT
mT
)
− δnm
TM′(nmT )
M(nmT ) α(m
T )− α(mT )λ
]
for k ∈ [0, n], (35)
where
α(mT )
.
= [(a− 1)λ(1− lT )/ρ][p′(mT )mT + p(mT )]M(nm
T )δmT
f(lT ,mT )
. (36)
5.2 The political equilibrium
The contribution schedules are functions of the international agency’s policy
variables (= the emission quotas) q[0,n]:
Rj(q[0,n]), j ∈ [0, n]. (37)
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Each country j ∈ [0, n] maximizes its expected utility (31) and the interna-
tional agency maximizes its expected utility (20). A subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Rj(q[0,n]) and pol-
icy q[0,n] such that the conditions (i) − (iv) in subsection 4.2 hold, with ε
being replaced by q[0,n]:
q[0,n] = arg max
q[0,n]
G
(
R[0,n](q[0,n])
)
= arg max
q[0,n]
∫ n
0
Rj(q[0,n])dj; (38)
q[0,n] = arg max
q[0,n]
∆j
(
q[0,n], R[0,n]\j, Rj(q[0,n])
)
for j ∈ [0, n], (39)
G
(
R[0,n](q[0,n])
) ≥ max
q[0,n]
G
(
R[0,n](q[0,n])
)∣∣∣
Rj=0
.
Noting (31), the conditions (39) are equivalent to
0 =
∂∆j
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
= −1
ρ
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
for all j and k,
and
∂Rj
∂qk
= ρ
∂∆j
∂qk
for all j and k. (40)
Noting (34), the first-order conditions of country j, (32), becomes
1− ξ
( lT
mT
)
=
lTfl(l
T ,mT )
f(lT ,mT )
=
(a− 1)λlT
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT )
[
1− (M
T )δmT
f(lT ,mT )
p
]
.
(41)
Noting (35) and (40), the equilibrium conditions (38) are equivalent to
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
Rjdj = ρ
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
∆jdj = 0.
From this and (35) it follows that
ξ
( lT
mT
)
= δ
nmTM′(nmT )
M(nmT ) + α(m
T )λ. (42)
5.3 The role of technological change
With λ→ 0, the equations (25) and (42) are the same, but the equations
in (26) and (41) must be ignored, because there is no R&D [cf. (7)]. Thus,
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non-traded and traded permits lead to the same outcome. With λ > 0,
the outcomes differ and, noting Proposition 2, a switch from non-traded to
traded permits is a Pareto worsening. These results can be rephrased as:
Proposition 3 If there were no technological change, λ→ 0, then emission
permit trade would not make any difference, lN = lT , mN = mT and ξN = ξT .
With technological change λ > 0, the international agreement with emission
permit trade is Pareto worsening.
Proposition 3 can explained as follows. To enable a stationary state
equilibrium, I assume that the emission permits for country j, qj, are set for
emissions mj times the level of productivity in that country, a
γj . This means
that country j discounts emissions costs pmj according to the effective rate
of return, ρ + (1 − a)λ(1 − lj), but the revenue from emission permits, pqj,
according to the rate of return, ρ [cf. (31)]. Consequently, at the level of the
whole coalition, the value of the expenditure flow of emission costs outweighs
that of the revenue flow from emission permits: noting (28), one obtains∫ n
0
aγj(T )pmj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj)dj −
∫ n
0
pqj
ρ
dj
=
[
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT ) −
1
ρ
] ∫ n
0
pqjdj =
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a− 1)(1− lT )
[ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]ρ
λ > 0.
Without technological change, λ→ 0, the effective rate of return equals the
rate of return, ρ, and emission permit trade makes no difference. If emission
permits are distributed evenly, qj = q, then, with technological change λ > 0,
all countries will suffer, and if unevenly, then at least some of the countries
will suffer from the introduction of emission trade.
6 Conclusions
This document examines the design of emission policy among a large number
of countries which produce the same good, so that there is no terms-of-trade
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effect. Production anywhere in the world incurs GHG emissions that de-
crease welfare everywhere. Labor and emissions are complementary in pro-
duction. Some countries can form an “abatement coalition”, authorizing an
international agency to grant them non-traded or traded GHG permits. This
agency is self-interested, subject to lobbying, and has no budget of its own.
The countries improve their productivity through research and development
(R&D). This creates a link between emissions and economic growth, which
affects the optimal design of emission policy.
Strategic complementarity in emission policy has been explained in the
literature as follows: An increase in the free riders’ real income due to better
terms of trade decreases emissions (e.g. Copeland and Taylor 2005). Induced
technological change leads to a reduction emissions among free riders as well
(e.g. Di Maria and Van der Werf 2008). Improvements in abatement tech-
nology generated by the emission constraint spill over to free riders, which
decrease their emissions (Golombek and Hoel 2004; Gerlach and Kuik 2007).
As an alternative explanation, I present a complementary effect as follows: If
the rest of the world cuts their emissions down, then the marginal disutility of
total emissions increases, encouraging the countries to reduce their emissions.
Because labor and emissions are complementary in production, labor input
in production falls. This decreases the wage and promotes labor-intensive
R&D. With a higher level of R&D, economic growth is faster.
The introduction of an international agency into the “abatement coali-
tion” helps to internalize the negative externality through GHG emissions.
With grandfathering, all countries face the same marginal benefits from emis-
sions via allocation in subsequent periods. Because the basis for allocation
can be updated over time, the international agency has a full control of
resources and the outcome is Pareto optimal. This holds true for both a
benevolent and a self-interested international agency.
With emission permit trade, the situation is more complicated. First, the
international agency should not have more policy instruments than one per
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country. Otherwise, it will reap all surpluses from the countries in a negoti-
ation game. This means that country-specific emission permit is the feasible
set of instruments for the the international agency. Second, in order to have
an agreement in a negotiation game, the system must have a stationary state
equilibrium. This is possible only, if emission permits are set in proportion
to the local productivity in each country. Consequently, at the level of the
whole coalition, the value of the expenditure flow of emission costs outweighs
that of the revenue flow from emission permits. Thus, at least some countries
will suffer from the introduction of emission permit trade and a stationary
state equilibrium with emission permit trade is not sustainable.
Appendix
A Functions (10)
The value of the optimal program is given by
Ωj(γj,m−j, T )
.
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (7)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
e−ρ(t−T )dt. (43)
I denote the value of the optimal program of country j with current tech-
nology γj by Ω
j = Ωj(γj,m−j, T ) and that with future technology γj + 1 by
Ω˜j = Ωj(γj+1,m−j, T ). The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal
program (43) is then
ρΩj = max
mj ,lj
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, T ), where (44)
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, T ) =
aγjf j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
+ λ(1− lj)
[
Ω˜j − Ωj]. (45)
Noting (6), this leads to the first-order conditions
∂Φj
∂mj
= aγj
[
f jm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
− δjf
j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj+1
]
= aγj
[
f j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δjmj
ξj
(
lj
mj
)
− δjf
j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj+1
]
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= aγj
f j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δjmj
[
ξj
(
lj
mj
)
− δjmj
mj +m−j
]
= 0, (46)
∂Φj
∂lj
=
aγjf jl (lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj
− λ[Ω˜j − Ωj]
=
aγjf j(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δj lj
[
1− ξj
(
lj
mj
)]
− λ[Ω˜j − Ωj] = 0. (47)
To solve the dynamic program (43), I try the solution that the value of
the program, Ωj, is in fixed proportion ϕj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Ωj(γj,m−j, T ) = ϕjaγj
f j(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δj
, (48)
where (l∗j ,m
∗
j) are the optimal values of (lj,mj). This implies
Ω˜j/Ωj = a. (49)
Inserting (48) and (49) into the Bellman equation (44) and (45) yields
1/ϕj = ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj) > 0. (50)
Inserting (8), (48), (49) and (50) into the conditions (46) and (47) yields
ξj
(
lj
mj
)
=
δjmj
mj +m−j
=
δjmj
M
∈ (0, 1), (51)
0 = ϕj
lj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂lj
=
aγjf j(lj,mj)ϕj
(mj +m−j)δjΩj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
[
1− ξj
(
lj
mj
)]
− λϕjlj
[
Ω˜j
Ωj︸︷︷︸
=a
−1
]
= 1− ξj
(
lj
mj
)
− (a− 1)λlj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj) . (52)
The equations (51) and (52) can be transformed into
log ξ(lj/mj) + logM − logmj = constants,
log lj −
[
ξj(lj/mj)
−1 − 1] = constants.
Differentiating this system totally and noting (6), one obtains
dmj
dM
=
1
M
∫ N
n
mj
[
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− ξj)mj
][
ξ′j
mjξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− ξj)mj
]−1
dj
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<
1
M
∫ N
n
mjdj < 1,
∂lj
∂M
=
mj
M
(ξ′j/ξj)lj
(1− ξj)(mj)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
ξ′j
mjξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
1
lj
+
ξ′j/ξj
(1− δjξj)mj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]−1
> 0,
From this and (4) it follows that dzj/dM = −dlj/dM < 0.
B Function (16) and condition (17)
Country j ∈ [0, n] maximizes (15) by lj subject to (7), given m[0,n] and R[0,n].
It is equivalent to maximize
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)e
−ρ(t−T )dt
by lj subject to (7), given mj and M . The value of this maximization is
Γj(γj,mj, T ) = max
lj s.t. (7)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)e
−ρ(t−T )dt. (53)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj,mj, T ) and Γ˜
j = Γj(γj + 1,mj, T ). The Bellman
equation corresponding to the optimal program (53) is
ρΓj = max
lj
Ψj(lj, γj,mj, T ), where (54)
Ψj(lj, γj,mj, T ) = a
γjf(lj,mj) + λ(1− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (55)
Noting (6), this leads to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjfl(lj,mj)− λ
[
Γ˜j − Γj] = aγj f(lj,mj)
lj
[
1− ξ
(
lj
mj
)]
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj]
= 0. (56)
To solve the dynamic program (53), I try the solution that the value of
the program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj,mj, T ) = ϑja
γjf(l∗j ,mj), (57)
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where l∗j is the optimal value of the control variable lj. This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (58)
Inserting (57) and (58) into the Bellman equation (54) and (55) yields
1/ϑj = ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j ) > 0. (59)
Inserting (57), (58) and (59) into (56), one obtains (17):
0 = ϑj
lj
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjf(lj,mj)
ϑj
Γj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
[
1− ξ
(
lj
mj
)]
−
(
Γ˜j
Γj︸︷︷︸
=a
−1
)
λljϑj
= 1− ξ
(
lj
mj
)
− (a− 1)λlj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
.
Noting (53), (57), (59) and (11), the expected utility of country j, (15),
becomes (16):
Υj(m[0,n], R[0,n],M) = Γ
j(γj,mj, T )M
−δ +
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
= ϑja
γj(T )f(l∗j ,mj)M
(∫ n
0
mkdk
)−δ
+
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
=
aγj(T )f(l∗j ,mj)
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
M
(∫ n
0
mkdk
)−δ
+
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj
)
,
where the optimal value l∗j of the control variable lj is taken as given.
C Function (32) and conditions (31) and (33)
Country j maximizes its expected utility (30) by emission and labor input
(mj, lj) subject to Poisson technological change (7), given the permits q[0,n],
the emission price p, emissions in the rest of the world, m−j, and political
contributions R[0,n]. It is equivalent to maximize∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−ρ(t−T )dt
23
by (lj,mj) subject to (7), given r, {qk}, p, m−j and Rj. The value of the
optimal program for country j can then be defined as follows:
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T )
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (7)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−ρ(t−T )dt. (60)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) and Γ˜j = Γj(γj + 1, p,m−j, T ). The
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (60) is
ρΓj = max
lj ,mj
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T ), where (61)
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T ) = aγj
[
f(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− pmj
]
+ λ(1− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (62)
This leads to the first-order conditions (63) and (64):
∂Ψj
∂mj
= aγj
[
fm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
− p
]
= 0, (63)
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
aγjfl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (64)
To solve the dynamic program (60), I try the solution that the value of
the program, Γj, is in fixed proportion $j > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) = $jaγj
[
f(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δ
− pm∗j
]
,
(65)
where (l∗j ,m
∗
j) are the optimal values of (lj,mj). This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (66)
Inserting (65) and (66) into the Bellman equation (61) and (62) yields
1/$j = ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j ) > 0. (67)
Given (60), (65), (67), country j’s utility (30) is defined as a function of
political contributions R[0,n] and emission permits q[0,n]:
∆j = Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) +
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + pqj
)
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= $ja
γj(T )
[
f(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δ
− pm∗j
]
+
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + p(mT )qj
)
=
aγj(T )
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
∗
j)
(m∗j +m−j)δ
− pm∗j
]
+
1
ρ
(
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + pqj
)
.
(68)
Noting (6), (65), (66) and (67), the first-order conditions (63) and (64) change
into (69) and (70):
p =
fm(l
∗
j ,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
=
f(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δmj
[
mjfm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− δmj
mj +m−j
]
=
f(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δmj
[
ξ
(
lj
mj
)
− δmj
mj +m−j
]
,
(69)
0 = $j
lj
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
aγjfl(lj,mj)lj$j
(mj +m−j)δΓj
− λlj$j
(
Γ˜j
Γj︸︷︷︸
=a
−1
)
=
ljfl(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj −
(a− 1)λlj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj)
=
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
[
1− ξ
(
lj
mj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lj) .
(70)
In the system of the equilibrium conditions m−j = M − mj [cf. (8)],
(69) and (70) for all j ∈ [0, n], there are the unknown variables (lj,mj) for
j ∈ [0, n] and the known variables M and p. Because in this system there is
perfect symmetry throughout j ∈ [0, n], one obtains
l∗j = lj = l
T and m∗j = mj = m
T for j ∈ [0, n]. (71)
Plugging (71) into (8), (11) and (28) yields
mT =
(∫ n
0
qkdk
)/∫ n
0
aγjdj, M =M(nmT ),
m−j(mT )
.
=M(nmT )−mT . (72)
25
Inserting (71) and (72) into (69), one can define
p(mT )
.
=
f(lT ,mT )
M(nmT )δmT
[
ξ
(
lT
mT
)
− δm
T
M(nmT )
]
.
(73)
Noting (71)-(73), one obtains that the expected utility of country j, (68),
and the equilibrium condition (70) are for given q[0,n] determined as follows:
∆j(q[0,n], R[0,n])
.
=
aγj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
+
1
ρ
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Rkdk −Rj + p(mT )qj
]
,
(74)
(a− 1)λlT
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT ) =
f(lT ,mT )M(nmT )−δ
f(lT ,mT )M(nmT )−δ − p(mT )mT
[
1− ξ
(
lT
mT
)]
.
(75)
The results (31), (33) and (32) are given by (74), (73) and (75).
Noting (73) and (34), the sum of the functions (31) is given by∫ n
0
∆j(R[0,n], q[0,n])dj
=
∫ n
0
aγj
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
dj +
p(mT )
ρ
∫ n
0
qjdj
=
{
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
+
mTp(mT )
ρ
}∫ n
0
aγjdj.
Noting and (6), (34) and l∗j = l
T for all j ∈ [0, n], this leads to
∂
∂qk
∫ n
0
∆j(R[0,n], q[0,n])dj
=
∂
∂mT
{
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
+
mTp(mT )
ρ
}
(∫ n
0
aγjdj
)
∂mT
∂qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
∂
∂mT
{
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ − p(m
T )mT
]
+
mTp(mT )
ρ
}
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=
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ
[
fm(l
∗
j ,m
T )
f(l∗j ,mT )
− nδM
′(nmT )
M(nmT )
]
+
[
1
ρ
− 1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
]
[p′(mT )mT + p(mT )]
=
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δ
[
1
mT
ξ
(
l∗j
mT
)
− nδM
′(nmT )
M(nmT )
]
+
(1− a)λ(1− l∗j )/ρ
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− l∗j )
[p′(mT )mT + p(mT )]
=
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT )
{
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δmT
[
ξ
(
lT
mT
)
− δnm
TM′(nmT )
M(nmT )
]
+ [(1− a)λ(1− lT )/ρ][p′(mT )mT + p(mT )]
}
=
1
ρ+ (1− a)λ(1− lT )
f(l∗j ,m
T )
M(nmT )δmT
×
[
ξ
(
lT
mT
)
− δnm
TM′(nmT )
M(nmT ) − α(m
T )λ
]
for k ∈ [0, n],
where α(mT ) is defined by (36).
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